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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to examine whether accounting 
regulation is associated with financial reporting quality in Nigeria. Using 
accrual-based earnings management construct – abnormal accruals 
as a proxy for financial reporting quality, the study found some 
significant variation in abnormal accruals with the implementation of 
International financial reporting standards (IFRS) to regulate 
accounting practice. Similarly, the research found that the control 
variables - firm size, leverage, and return on asset have significant 
effects on financial reporting quality. This study is found to be 
consistent with previous studies indicating the effectiveness of IFRS 
adoption in improving financial reporting quality. The study also 
contributes to the discussion on IFRS adoption across reporting 
environments. Regulatory agencies in Nigeria might need to consider 
the combined effect of other corporate governance laws to ensure 
quality reporting. The study is limited by our sample (2009 - 2014), and 
by the proxies for both accounting regulation and financial reporting 
quality, the data of which was in most part handpicked. Future research 
might consider testing the combined effect of other corporate 
governance variables like audit committees and board characteristics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The quality of financial reporting has been an issue of concern to regulators, standard 
setters, policymakers, and shareholders alike. This situation has shaken investor’s 
confidence in financial reporting and corporate governance on several instances to date. 
These upheavals have led to chain reaction across regulatory borders, with the enactment 
of laws and regulations that influence corporate financial reporting (Filip, Labelle, & 
Rousseau, 2015). There is empirical evidence that supports the view that IAS/IFRS 
adoption enhances the quality of financial reporting, which increases its relevance to 
investors. The main aim of IFRS adoption is to see improvement in accounting quality. 
Palea (2013) concluded that accounting regulation is a critical factor that determines 
financial reporting quality (FRQ). In contrast, Ahmed, Neel, and Wang (2013) found 
evidence of a decline in accounting quality after IFRS adoption. 
 Motivated by IFRS adoption in 2012 and the series of recent regulatory initiatives and 
corporate governance codes, and the study of Abdulmalik and Ahmad (2016), this paper 
examines (1) accounting regulation is associated with FRQ, (2) there is shift in this 
relationship for the years following IFRS, and (3) overall, FRQ declined following IFRS. 
1We employ the accrual-based earnings management construct – abnormal accruals to 
proxy for FRQ, we found some variation in abnormal accruals with the adoption of IFRS, 
to regulate accounting.  
 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of Nigeria passed a regulation which requires 
all publicly listed firms to adopt IFRS, starting from January 2012. This regulation is 
expected to cause a paradigm shift in the business environment because before 2012; 
firms followed local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). To provide insight 
into how this expected change had progressed, the study reviews the literature on IFRS 
adoption and their effects on reporting quality. Thereafter, the study provides empirical 
evidence on these changes for the pre- and post-IFRS periods. Accordingly, the need to 
further investigate the extent to which accounting regulation affects FRQ (Palea, 2013) 
remains a subject of debate and investigation in different regulatory environments. This is 
so because, over the years, progress has been made in some areas of the corporate 
information setting, notably the disclosure regulation consequences and the economic 
outcome of financial reporting decisions (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010). 
 To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is only one study, that is Abdulmalik and 
Che-Ahmad (2016) that examines the effects of regulatory change on financial reporting 
quality in Nigeria for a relatively large sample of firms. Similarly, this study differs from 
Abdulmalik and Che-Ahmad (2016) in three areas. First, the research focuses on IFRS 
implementation which proxy for accounting regulation, whereas their regulatory change is 
concerned with the contemporaneous corporate governance code. Second, the paper 
shows that abnormal accruals are more positive for IFRS firms for the post-adoption 
period. However, their findings of a decrease in absolute discretionary accruals and 
abnormal audit fees might be essentially driven by clients who pay abnormally higher audit 
fees, which does not necessarily suggest a decrease in earnings management. Third, the 
study adopted and applied the test for Cramer’s z-statistics which gives additional insights. 
 The purpose of this study is to examine (1) accounting regulation is associated with 
financial reporting quality, (2) this relationship changed for the years following IFRS, and 
(3) overall, financial reporting quality declined following IFRS. The authors employed 
accrual-based earnings management construct – abnormal accruals as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality, and found some variation in abnormal accruals with the 
                                               
1 Our accruals-based earnings management construct is abnormal accruals measured by the Kothari et al (2005) performance-
adjusted model. The model is appropriate to this study for its specificity on current earnings as generated by prior year assets.  
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implementation of IFRS to regulate accounting. The study contributes to the debate IFRS 
adoption for a quality financial reporting. Regulatory bodies might find this research useful 
to consolidate on implementation specificity of IFRS provisions.  
 This paper is organised into five sections. The next following introduction section, 
Section 2 presents a literature review and hypothesis development. Section 3 discusses 
the research design while Section 4 presents empirical results based on the analysis. The 
last section, Section 5 concludes this paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Most accounting and corporate governance research have focused majorly on corporate 
board characteristics, audit committee attributes, and auditors as the mechanisms for 
enhancing financial reporting quality. Accounting regulation provides the platform on which 
corporate financial reporting thrives. Therefore, the role that regulatory agencies and their 
lawmaker's allies play to determine financial reporting outcome cannot be 
overemphasised.  
 
2.1  Financial Reporting Quality 
 
A higher quality financial reporting with the corresponding higher disclosure requirement 
that follows IFRS adoption can potentially mitigate managerial incentive for accruals 
earnings management (Iatridis, 2010). Objectivity would lead to less opportunism to 
influence reported earnings which is misleading to investors. Thus, in reporting 
environments with robust investor protection mechanisms, like the UK and the EU, IFRS 
adoption costs would likely be lower. This is true since earnings management level is lower 
because managers have less chance to manipulate accounting earnings (Dayanandan et 
al., 2016; Palea, 2013; Soderstrom & Sun, 2007).  In contrast, jurisdictions with weak 
investor protection rights have higher scope earnings management, and thus lowering the 
quality of financial reporting, which implies a higher IFRS adoption costs.  
 The financial reporting quality hypotheses in this study examine whether IFRS 
adoption (a proxy for accounting regulation) enhances or diminishes earnings 
management in Nigeria (see Abdulmalik & Ahmad, 2016; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). 
Following Abbott, Daugherty, Parker, and Peters (2016), we employed the Kothari, Leone, 
and Wasley (2005) performance-matched measure of abnormal accruals as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality. The model was developed to report current earnings as 
generated by the value of lagged assets. This can easily be manipulated by opportunistic 
managers.  
 
2.2 Accounting Regulation 
 
Akisik (2013) document that accounting regulation has continued to be the epicentre of an 
enduring debate in the accounting field, with the debate coming to the limelight following 
several dramatic financial reporting scandals and frauds in the early 2000s. This event 
together with several recent scandals did diminish public confidence in capital markets. 
These accounting scandals that erupted in the USA caused several upheavals. First, 
Enron’s fall stupefied the world (Di Pietra, McLeay, & Ronen, 2010). An appalling unfolding 
series of accounting irregularities in other large US corporations followed, and this spread 
into Europe, Asia, Australia, and Africa. Nigeria has its fair share of the fraud in Cadbury 
and several other listed firms.  
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 These upheavals caused the lawmakers to act in the form of regulatory reforms 
around the world. There is Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US, and numerous corporate 
governance codes around the world followed. Nigeria joined other countries to adopt the 
IFRS – financial institutions in 2009, and non-financial firms in 2012. So, “the institutions 
of accounting regulation continue to change with the increasing worldwide adoption of 
IFRS” (Wagenhofer, 2011). 
 The increasing need to improve on the quality of financial statements prompt 
regulators to standardise and increase coverage of the explanatory and narrative aspects 
of annual reports and accounts (Di Pietra, Gebhardt, McLeay, & Ronen, 2014). This can 
be observed by the increase in some pages and volume of annual reports occasioned by 
forward-looking items that may not necessarily improve FRQ (Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2015). 
The quest for more effective regulation is closely linked to corporate governance laws 
requires sufficient dynamism to provide for the complexities of the changing firms’ 
characteristics. 
 
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Extant literature suggests that accounting regulation improves financial reporting quality 
(Abdulmalik & Ahmad, 2016; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2015; Inchausti, 1997; Jones & 
Sharma, 2001; Wagenhofer, 2011). Palea (2013) examined whether IFRS affect FRQ. Her 
empirical evidence supported the view that IFRS adoption enhances FRQ, which is 
beneficial to the investors. Even though empirical findings indicate arguments in support 
of an improved reporting quality under IFRS, yet there are grounds to suggest mandatory 
adoption per se does not suffice to improve FRQ. Some other factors in country’s legal 
system and political environment provide incentives in the financial reporting process. 
 Jones and Sharma (2001) examined the impact of financial leverage, free cash flow, 
and accounting regulation on earnings management. They found that the stringent 
disclosure regulation imposed by the Australian Stock Exchange was responsible for the 
variation in the levels of effect free cash flow and financial leverage has on earnings 
management. While the negative sign of the leverage variable indicates a counter-intuitive 
premise that lower leverage is related to higher earnings management. On the other hand, 
the sign of the free cash flow turned mixed, which indicates that free cash flow levels are 
not associated with earnings management. 
 According to the agency theory, managerial opportunistic behaviour potentially 
influences accounting earnings in their favour regarding bonuses and substantial 
executive compensations following a favourable performance evaluation. This provides a 
pretext for conflict of interests as this opportunistic behaviour affect the quality of financial 
reports perused by the investors. The theory, therefore, provides an avenue to 
understanding the influence of accounting standards such as IFRS on the managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour, that borders on several forms of earnings management 
(Dayanandan et al., 2016). Dayanandan et al. (2016) found empirical evidence that 
presupposes IFRS adoption leads to a decline in earnings management where high-level 
financial disclosure requirements exist.  
 Meanwhile, IFRS adoption, (i.e. accounting regulation) affect FRQ which cause 
convergence in financial reporting (Palea, 2013). Moreover, this relationship often 
changes in the years following a regulatory initiative and intervention, for example, SOX 
(Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Ghosh, Marra, & Moon, 2010).  The findings on the association 
between these variables continue to be inconsistent (Iatridis, 2010; Lin & Hwang, 2010). 
 Based on the preceding argument, the authors hypothesised that: 
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H1: There is a positive relationship between accounting regulation and financial 
reporting quality. 
H2: There is a change in the relationship between accounting regulation and financial 
reporting quality in the years following IFRS. 
 




This study is based on listed non-financial firms that were directed to implement IFRS in 
Nigeria, beginning from January 2012. The research covers 2009 to 2014 time-periods, 
inclusive. The study used 200 firms listed on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, 
from which samples were collected. We came out with a final sample of 96 firms having 
dropped the financial firms as well as those firms that did not have complete information. 
The financial firms have a separate regulatory body that encouraged them to adopt IFRS 
from 2009. Corporate governance data were hand-collected from the annual reports 
downloaded from the NSE website.  We also obtained financial data from Thomson 
Reuters EIKON database.   
 The critical financial parameter employed was financial reporting quality proxied by 
abnormal accruals. We analysed it using the performance-adjusted Kothari et al. (2005) 
model to detect accruals earnings management. We examined the nexus between 
accounting regulation and FRQ using a panel regression. 
 
4.2 Regression Model 
 
To test the nexus between accounting regulation and financial reporting quality in the pre- 
and post- IFRS evidence, the authors adapt a regression model from previous research 
as follows: 
 
ABNACCit = β0it + β1AREGit + β2FSIZEit + β3ROAit + β4LEVit + β5LSTAGEit + β6BIG4it 
YEAR_D + INDUSTRY_D + εit                                                                                               (1) 
   
The variables employed in the empirical model are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Variables definition and measurements 
Variable Variable Label Measurement Source 
ABNACC Abnormal accruals Abnormal accruals from the 
performance-matched cross-sectional 
model of Kothari et al. (2005) 
Abbott et al. (2016); 
Abdulmalik and Ahmad 
(2016) 
AREG Accounting regulation 
(Financial reporting 
system) 
A dummy variable assumes a value of 1 
for the post-IFRS period and a value of 0 
for the pre-IFRS period 
Dayanandan et al. 
(2016); 
Iatridis (2010) 
FSIZE Firm size Log of total assets Bonetti et al (2016); 
Inchausti (1997) 
ROA Return on assets Net income/total assets Bonetti et al (2016); 
Inchausti (1997) 
LEV Leverage Total liabilities/total assets Bonetti et al (2016); 
Inchausti (1997) 
LSTAGE Listing age Log of listing age Archambeault, Dezoort, 
and Hermanson (2008) 
BIG4 BIG4 firms A dummy variable is 1 if a firm is BIG4, 
and 0 otherwise 
Abdulmalik and Ahmad 
(2016); Inchausti 
(1997) 
Note: ABNACC = abnormal accruals, AREG = accounting regulation, FSIZE = firm size, LEV = leverage, ROA = return on 
assets, LSTAGE = listing age, BIG4 = big4 firms. 
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4.3 Dependent Variable 
 
Following prior literature (Abbott et al., 2016; Kothari et al., 2005), our measure of financial 
reporting quality is obtained from the performance-matched Jones model. We compute 
abnormal accruals as the residuals of error-term from the following regression: 
 
TAit/Ait-1 = β0 + β1(1/Ait-1) + β2((ΔREVit - ΔARit)/Ait-1) + β3(PPEit/Ait-1) + β4(NPit/Ait-1) + εit 
               (2) 
 
Where; Total accruals (TAit) for firm i for year t  is computed as the difference between net 
profit (that is, income before extraordinary items) and the operating cash flows. Ait is the 
total assets. ΔREVit is the change in revenue.  ΔARit is the change in account receivables. 
PPEit is the gross value of plant, property, and equipment. NPit is the net profit. εit is the 
error term. β0 is the intercept. β1 to β4 are the coefficients of independent variables.   
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This study mainly examines whether accounting regulation is associated with financial 
reporting quality. We employ accrual-based earnings management construct – abnormal 
accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality.  We include control variables - firm size, 
leverage, return on asset, and big4 firms (which include Ernst & Young, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, and KPMG) to run our regression analysis. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this study. The mean, 
standard deviation and median of abnormal accruals (ABNACC) are 0.723, 0.380, and 
0.722 respectively. On the average accounting regulation has about 69% compliance with 
IFRS, with a standard deviation of 0.46. the skewness and kurtosis are 0.80 and 1.64 
respectively. For the control variables, firm size shows an average of 7.04 with a standard 
deviation of 0.70. The firms are moderately leveraged at 57% with a standard deviation of 
20%. The average return on asset is somewhat on the low side, 4%. The firms are quite 
old with a median listing age of 21. Most of the firms have BIG4 firms as their auditors, 
with an average of 55%. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min Max Mean Standard Deviation Median Skewness Kurtosis 
ABNACC .1437216 1.339746 .7228415 .3803767 .7222148 .0444415 1.846009 
AREG 0 1 .6857639 .4646144 1 -.8003426 1.640548 
FSIZE 5.85474 8.140601 7.044807 .7000177 7.009895 .0122377 1.880038 
LEV .2509715 .9265614 .5731638 .2006032 .5611996 .1053861 2.049793 
ROA -.1187917 .1788974 .0440603 .0836001 .0466465 -.2752401 2.535552 
LSTAGE 0 59 20.63715 13.58126 21 .2263493 2.005380 
BIG4 0 1 . 5520833 .4977122 1 -.2094729 1.043879 
Note: ABNACC = abnormal accruals, AREG = accounting regulation, FSIZE = firm size, LEV = leverage, ROA = return on 
assets, LSTAGE = listing age, BIG4 = big4 firms. 
  
5.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients of the variables. A look at the table indicates 
that there is no multicollinearity. The highest correlation between and among the 
explanatory variables is 0.5936. Accounting regulation has positive and significant 
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correlations with firm size, listing age, and Big4, but a negative nexus with abnormal 
accruals as expected. Abnormal accruals have a significant negative association with firm 
size. This translates to the bigger the size of the firm, the more the abnormal accruals 
declines. 
 
Table 3. Pairwise correlation 
 ABNACC AREG LFSIZE LEV ROA LSTAGE BIG4 
ABNACC 1.0000       
AREG -0.0779 1.0000      
FSIZE -0.1149* 0.1963* 1.0000     
LEV 0.0727 0.0569 0.1246* 1.0000    
ROA 0.0744 -0.0628 0.1769* -0.3266* 1.0000   
LSTAGE 0.1372* 0.1023* -0.0743 0.1751* 0.1373* 1.0000  
BIG4 -0.0019 0.5936* 0.0396 0.0177 -0.0461 0.1056* 1.0000 
Note: Significance at 5% level denoted as *. ABNACC = abnormal accruals, AREG = accounting regulation, FSIZE = firm 
size, LEV = leverage, ROA = return on assets, LSTAGE = listing age, BIG4 = big4 firms. 
 
5.3 Abnormal Accruals around IFRS 
 
As the primary objective of IFRS is to provide a high-quality financial reporting and 
information that is understandable and usable by investors and other stakeholders, we 
examine whether the adoption of IFRS affects the financial reporting quality of sample 
firms. Table 4 presents the standard deviation, mean and median of our abnormal accruals 
measure both for the pre-and post-IFRS periods. The results show that the abnormal 
accruals measures for the post-IFRS period are lower than the pre-SOX numbers. The 
mean absolute abnormal accruals declined from 0.753 to 0.717 over the periods, with a 
mean difference of 0.036, statistically significant at 1%. We obtained a similar result for 
return on assets. Also, the study examined whether the disparity in the accounting 
regulation measure differs between the pre-and post-IFRS years. The authors found a 
decline in the standard deviation of accounting regulation from 0.493 to 0.200 for the pre- 
and post-IFRS years. Hence, there was a decline of 0.293 in the variation of accounting 
regulation following the passage of IFRS. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for abnormal accruals surrounding IFRS 
 Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Difference 
  Stdev Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev Mean Median 
ABNACC 0.410 0.753 0.742 0.444 0.717 0.710 -0.034 0.036*** 0.032*** 
AREG 0.493 0.413 0.000 0.200 0.958 1.000 0.293 -0.545 -1.000 
ROA 0.138 0.057 0.058 0.158 0.025 0.038 -0.020 0.032*** 0.020*** 
Note: This table shows the standard deviation, mean, and median of abnormal accruals surrounding IFRS. Abnormal accruals are 
taken as the absolute value of the abnormal discretionary accrual measure for matched-performance. AREG is accounting 
regulation, proxy by IFRS. ROA is a return on asset. We separate our sample into the pre-IFRS (2009 to 2011) and post-IFRS (2012 
to 2014) periods. Significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted as ***, **,* respectively, for a one-tailed test. 
 
Overall, the results indicate that abnormal accruals earnings management reduced 
significantly following the adoption of IFRS, and the values gravitate to cluster round about 
the mean in excess of what they were during the pre-IFRS years. Accordingly, financial 
reporting quality improved following the implementation of IFRS. 
 
5.4 Diagnostic Tests 
 
Table 5 reports the summary of the diagnostic tests conducted. The continuous variables 
were all winsorised at 8% for outliers removal. We carried out the Hausman test to 
compare the random effect and fixed effect models, and the random effect turned better 
because the p-value obtained is 0.6997 which is greater than 0.10. Indeed, the skewness 
Jehu, P., & Ibrahim, M. A.  
31 
and kurtosis values on Table 2 above shows that the data are all normal. The highest 
kurtosis obtained is 2.53 while the highest skewness is 0.105. The Breusch-Pagan test 
(0.2020) indicated no heteroscedasticity, hence fulfilling the homoscedasticity 
requirement. We detected no multicollinearity as the mean-variance inflation factor (VIF) 
of 1.34 is <2.0, as recommended by Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2014). The highest 
value is AREG having 1.64, and the least is LSTAGE having 1.13. The Wald test value of 
26.07, having a statistical significance at 0.0005 indicates the model fitness. However, the 
Wooldridge test (0.0509) showed that there is serial correlation problem. So, the study 
employed the xtregar command in Stata to solve the problem. Similarly, the authors 
carried out a robustness test for the random effects to solve both the heteroscedasticity 
as well as the serial correlation problem. We obtained a p-value of 0.0005 and a Wald 
value of 23.08, which is similar to the result obtained for the random effect. 
 
Table 5. Diagnostic tests 
Tests x² P 
Breusch-Pagan test 1.63 0.2020 
Wald 26.07 0.0005 
Wooldridge test 3.911 0.0509 
VIF  1.34 
 Source: Diagnostic output from Stata software 
 
5.5 Regression Results 
 
Table 6 shows our results based on the sample examined, whether or not the accounting 
regulation affects financial reporting quality. Our results provide evidence that accounting 
regulation has a negative statistical significant effect on financial reporting quality, for all 
the regressions carried out. The results of the pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect 
are significant at 5%, while the robustness test is significant at 10%. 
 This study is run based on random effect. The coefficient of accounting regulation 
(AREG) on Table 6 indicates that there is a reduction in abnormal accruals by 0.0595 for 
each additional unit of AREG. The result suggests that accounting regulation exerts 
preference for IFRS to local GAAP which discourage accrual-based earnings 
management. 
 Consistent with prior literature (Abdulmalik & Che-Ahmad, 2016; Dayanandan et al., 
2016; Iatridis, 2010; Palea, 2013), we document that accounting regulation significantly 
reduces abnormal discretionary accruals which in turn improves financial reporting quality. 
The remaining results are control variables. They depict the inability of accounting 
regulation to significantly affect FRQ on a stand-alone basis.  
 
Table 6. Regression results 
Variables Pooled OLS Random Effects Robust re Fixed Effects 
AREG -0.0595** -0.0595** -0.0595* -0.0667** 
 (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0358) (0.0323) 
FSIZE -0.0778* -0.0778* -0.0778 -0.122 
 (0.0442) (0.0442) (0.0487) (0.115) 
LEV 0.167* 0.167* 0.167 0.125 
 (0.0930) (0.0930) (0.124) (0.105) 
ROA 0.829*** 0.829*** 0.829*** 0.938*** 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.238) (0.212) 
LSTAGE 0.142* 0.142* 0.142** 0.331** 
 (0.0777) (0.0777) (0.0672) (0.154) 
BIG4 0.0393 0.0393 0.0393 0.0301 
 (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0365) (0.0369) 
Constant 0.978*** 0.978*** 0.978*** 1.102 
 (0.324) (0.324) (0.346) (0.804) 
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Observations 576 576 576 576 
R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.056 0.056 
Number of firms 96 96 96 96 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ABNACC = abnormal accruals, AREG 
= accounting regulation, FSIZE = firm size, LEV = leverage, ROA = return on assets, LSTAGE = listing age, 
BIG4 = big4 firms. 
 
5.6 Robustness Test 
 
We carried out a robustness test to solve the problem of heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation on our random effect model. The results show the coefficient of accounting 
regulation (AREG) has a p-value of 0.043 which is negative and significant at 5% level. 
The result is consistent with all the tests we conducted. 
 
5.7 Pre- and Post-IFRS Additional Test 
 
Consistent with Tsalavoutas, André, and Evans (2012), we carried out the Cramer’s Z-
statistics test to see whether the relationship between accounting regulation and financial 
reporting quality changed for the years following IFRS. The within R-squared for the pre-
IFRS is 0.026 while that of the post-IFRS is 0.083. The result indicates a Z-score of -1.67. 
Therefore, from our standard normal distribution table, we obtained the value 0.04746 
which is significant at 5% level. This suggests that there is a significant variation in the 




Fundamentally motivated by the series of regulatory initiatives, including IFRS adoption 
beginning 2012, and the recent work of Abdulmalik and Ahmad (2016), we examine 
whether (1) accounting regulation is associated with financial reporting quality, (2) this 
relationship changed over the years following IFRS, and (3) overall, financial reporting 
quality declined following IFRS. Using accrual-based earnings management construct – 
abnormal accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality, we found some variation in 
abnormal accruals with the implementation of IFRS to regulate accounting.  
 The result of this study is consistent with Abdulmalik and Ahmad (2016) indicating 
that a regulatory change improves the financial reporting process. Although employed as 
control variables, we found that firm size, leverage, and return on asset have significant 
effects on financial reporting quality. The return on asset is particularly, significant at 1%, 
which show its nexus with the performance-matched Kothari model.   
 Overall, our evidence suggests that accounting regulation is successfully preventing 
corporate accrual earnings management, thereby improving financial reporting quality for 
the post-IFRS period. Hence, consistent with the conclusion by Dayanandan et al. (2016), 
IFRS adoption is effective in improving financial reporting quality. Nevertheless, because 
our study is univariate, our results may not provide acumen on the general effectiveness 
of IFRS.  
 Our research contributes to the discussion on IFRS adoption across reporting 
environments. The global convergence on IFRS is yet on-going with some countries 
retaining their local GAAP. Regulatory agencies in Nigeria might need to consider the 
combined effect of other corporate governance laws to ensure quality reporting. Our study 
is limited by our proxies for both accounting regulation and financial reporting quality, the 
data of which was in most part handpicked. Further studies might consider testing the 
combined effect of other corporate governance variables like audit committees and board 
characteristics. 
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